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Regulating Nuclear Power in the New Millennium  
(The Role of the Public) 
ANTHONY Z. ROISMAN,* ERIN HONAKER,** AND ETHAN SPANER*** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On October 9, 2008, the Energy Information Administration of the 
U.S. Department of Energy reported that twenty-five applications for new 
civilian commercial nuclear power reactors had been filed with the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and are under review.  In August 2008, the 
NRC disclosed in its 2008-2009, Information Digest Report that it "will 
increase staffing levels to accommodate up to twenty-three [combined 
construction and operating license] applications for a total of thirty-four 
new nuclear units over the next few years."1  In the same Report, the NRC 
also disclosed that as "of February 2008, approximately half of the licensed 
reactor units have either received or are under review for license renewal" 
and "48 units (26 sites) have received renewed licenses."2 
In short, we are in the midst of the "Second Coming" of nuclear power.  
Many changes have been made in the process for deciding whether to 
license or re-license a commercial nuclear power plant from the early days 
 
 * Mr. Roisman is the managing partner of the National Legal Scholars Firm and a 
Research Fellow in Environmental Studies at Dartmouth College.  He is a graduate of 
Dartmouth College (1960) and Harvard Law School (L.L.B. 1963).  Mr. Roisman has been 
lead counsel or co-lead counsel in several landmark environmental cases, including Calvert 
Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1971), and Anderson v. W.R. Grace (D. Mass, settled in 1986).  
 **  Ms. Honaker is expected to graduate from Pace Law School in 2010 with a 
certificate in Environmental Law. 
 *** Mr. Spaner is expected to graduate from Pace Law School in 2010 with a certificate 
in Environmental Law. 
 1. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 2008-2009 INFORMATION DIGEST 43 (2008), 
available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1350/. 
 2. Id. at 47. 
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of the "First Coming."  The single most significant change has been in the 
public participation process by which the NRC decides whether to issue a 
new or renewed license.  In its August 2008, Report, the NRC asserts the 
"new licensing process is a substantial improvement over the system used in 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s."3  The keystone of those "improvements" has 
been to substantially reduce the opportunity for public participation in the 
licensing process.  The reason for these changes has been to address a 
perceived problem – unwarranted delay in completing the licensing process 
because of the alleged dilatory and substantively irrelevant input from an 
uninformed and irrational public. 
On October 8, at the U.S. Department of Commerce's "Nuclear Energy 
Summit," NRC Chairman Dale Klein delivered a short address, tellingly 
entitled "Promoting Public Confidence in Nuclear Safety through High 
Standards."4  In his talk, Chairman Klein emphasized that a fundamental 
role of the NRC and the public participation process is to "make extra 
efforts to explain" why certain actions are being taken by the NRC.5  This 
echoes a procedure begun at the time of the earliest nuclear power plant 
licensing proceedings.  In those days, the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) used the "limited appearance" statement process as an opportunity 
for the general public to express their views, usually concerns, and then to 
have someone from the regulatory staff or the applicant, explain in simple 
terms why the expressed concerns were unfounded.6  These "tutorials" 
became significant parts of the public relations program of the AEC.  The 
process changed as the public became more sophisticated and the questions 
became less capable of simplistic answers so that today, while limited 
appearances are still allowed, there is no effort by the regulatory staff or the 
applicant to respond.  Rather, like those contentions which, for some 
technical or legalistic reason, are deemed unacceptable for admission into a 
hearing, the questions raised during the limited appearances, no matter how 
substantively relevant they may be, usually go unanswered. 
Underlying all of these policies is a firm conviction, often masked but 
never fully hidden, at the highest levels of the NRC, that public 
 
 3. Id. at 43. 
 4. Dale E. Klein, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Remarks to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce Nuclear Energy Summit: Promoting Public Confidence in Nuclear 
Safety through High Standards (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/commission/speeches/2008/s-08-040.html. 
 5. Id. at 2. 
 6. 10 C.F.R § 2.705 (1984), now 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(a) (2008) (a person not a party to a 
hearing may “be permitted to make a limited appearance by making an oral or written 
statement of his or her position on the issues”). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/2
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participation is either a necessary evil foisted upon the agency by Congress 
in the original Atomic Energy Act or a public relations tool to be used as a 
way to convince the public that nuclear power plants are safe by allowing 
them to believe they are effectively participating in a process where they 
can see how well all legitimate concerns are addressed and resolved.  As to 
the important business of safety, most of NRC's highest executives believe 
the real safety of nuclear power plants rests squarely and comfortably on the 
NRC's own vigorous examinations and oversight, and the industry's solid 
commitment to safety and security. If the NRC were right, that public 
participation is irrelevant to safety and that nuclear power plant safety is 
assured by the NRC's regulatory actions and industry's commitments, then 
the steps it has taken over the last couple of decades to severely restrict and 
control public participation would at least have some rational basis.  
However, there is virtually no evidence to support the NRC's opinion 
regarding the lack of substantive benefits to public participation nor of its 
confidence that nuclear reactors are safe because of the NRC's efforts and 
the industry's commitment.  In fact, there is considerable evidence that 
NRC's opinion is wrong on both counts.  First, the evidence demonstrates 
that public participation can and has contributed substantially to the safety 
of nuclear power plants and second, the NRC and the industry have fallen 
down in their safety obligations in significant ways.7 
In an important law review article, Richard Goldsmith, Professor of 
Law at Syracuse University, wrote almost two decades ago, "[r]eviving 
public 'confidence' in 'nuclear safety' thus requires the restoration of public 
confidence in 'nuclear regulation,' and the history of nuclear regulation in 
this country teaches that such confidence cannot be obtained if the public is 
excluded from the licensing process."8  Seventeen years later, the wisdom 
of that analysis is evident. 
The NRC's present regulatory scheme, which severely limits public 
participation, is based on several premises, each of which is demonstrably in 
error.  These assumptions are: 
 
1.  Over-active public participation was the cause of the demise of the 
nuclear industry because it delayed licensing which increased costs 
and made nuclear power unacceptable; 
 
 7. See infra Section IV. 
 8. Richard Goldstein, Regulatory Reform and the Revival of Nuclear Power, 20 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 160 (1991). 
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2. The new, more efficient, NRC has actually increased public 
confidence in nuclear power because the NRC has strengthened 
nuclear safety regulation; 
 
3.  The new regulations on public participation make for more 
efficient and predictable licensing outcomes.9 
II.  WHAT KILLED NUCLEAR POWER 
Although some opponents of nuclear power may get pleasure in the 
idea that they were responsible for the death of nuclear power, the truth is, it 
was a suicide, not a murder.  In the early days there were over-assurances 
about nuclear safety and the "too cheap to meter" mantra.  These were 
followed by the unyielding insistence that all was well with nuclear power 
even as unforeseen problems arose, like fuel densification10 and the 
Brown's Ferry fire.11  Then, there was mounting evidence that nuclear 
wastes were a growing problem in search of a diminishing solution.12  The 
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), an advisory 
committee established by Congress,13 regularly identifies unresolved safety 
problems that require regulatory attention.14  The list of unresolved safety 
problems actually grew over the years, even as some of the problems were 
being addressed, particularly as the nuclear industry rapidly increased the 
size of nuclear reactors from a few hundred megawatts to 1300 
megawatts.15  All of these events were like radiation-induced embrittlement 
of the credibility of nuclear power and the Three Mile Island (TMI) 
accident, involving a nearly brand new 900-megawatt reactor, was the 
thermal shock that shattered that credibility.16  TMI was not a full nuclear 
reactor meltdown; it was a full nuclear reactor credibility meltdown. 
 
 9. See infra Section III. 
 10. See Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 485 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
 11. OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 
BULLETIN NO. 75-04A, CABLE FIRE AT BROWN’S FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (Apr. 3, 1975). 
 12. WARREN S. MELFORT, NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL: CURRENT ISSUES & PROPOSALS 
vii-viii (2003). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (2006); 10 C.F.R. § 1.13 (2008). 
 14. See THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE 
MILE ISLAND, COMMISSION FINDINGS: G. THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, ¶ 7 
(1979) [hereinafter TMI REPORT], available at http://www.pddoc.com/tmi2/kemeny/. 
 15. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 16. See generally id; see also U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FACT SHEET: THREE 
MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT 1 [hereinafter TMI FACT SHEET], available at http://www.nrc.gov/ 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/2
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Following the accident, no new nuclear reactors were ordered in the 
United States and many reactors planned or under construction were 
cancelled.17  The nuclear power industry was in shambles because of its 
own arrogant dismissal of safety concerns and not for any other reason.  
The public was now convinced that nuclear power could not be operated 
reliably and safely.  Several investigations were conducted regarding the 
root causes of the TMI accident18 and, as a result of those investigations, 
expensive and time-consuming modifications were required to most 
existing plants as well as those under construction and planned.19  The 
economic costs were rising rapidly and eventually it became evident to 
everyone but the most die-hard nuclear advocate, that any attempt to build 
more nuclear power plants would face powerful public opposition, in part, 
because the plants were economically unacceptable.20 
III.  WHO TO BLAME? 
Because neither the industry nor its supporters were able to accept the 
fact that they were the cause of the demise of nuclear power, they chose to 
make the public the scapegoat and to start an aggressive campaign to 
modify the rules by which the public could participate in the decisions 
relating to the siting, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants.  
In the latest in a long line of attacks on public participation, Llewellyn 
King, a long time pro-nuclear journalist, wrote about the origins of public 
participation and how he perceived it was used in licensing: 
The idea was that this openness would encourage the public to take a 
greater interest in nuclear science and the civilian uses of nuclear. 
No other licensing procedure was so open or, as it turned out, so 
subject to distortion and abuse. 
The net effect of the licensing regime established for nuclear was 
that any member of the public, without technical background and 
without any identifiable stake-holding in the proposed plant, could 
 
reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html. 
 17. Marsha Freeman, Who Killed U.S. Nuclear Power?, 21ST CENTURY SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY, Spring 2001, at 23. 
 18. See generally TMI REPORT, supra note 14. 
 19. See TMI FACT SHEET, supra note 16, at 3-4. 
 20. See Freeman, supra note 17, at 4-6. 
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have standing and start the process of delaying a technical decision 
with lay arguments.21 
In his recent address at the Nuclear Energy Summit, NRC Chairman 
Klein quoted from an Energy Daily article by King in which King 
bemoaned the fact that there is more public input in nuclear power plant 
licensing than in drug, airplane, or bridge approval.22  While Chairman 
Klein acknowledged that "transparency and public involvement must be key 
elements of the NRC's licensing and oversight" as noted above, his central 
theme is that the role of public participation is to build public confidence in 
nuclear power, not to enhance nuclear safety.23  However, if one is to 
believe the nuclear industry claim, that not a single life has been lost due to 
the civilian nuclear power program, then nuclear power is doing much 
better with its enhanced public participation, than prescription drugs, 
airplane designs, or bridges where there is essentially no public input.  One 
must wonder what lesson should be learned from King's comparison. 
It is true that many NRC licensing hearings have been prolonged and 
stretched out over many years.  But it was not the number of hearing days 
that made the process so long, it was how long it was taking the applicants 
and the NRC Staff to complete their reviews and submit their full case.  
Often, several days of hearings would result in months of delay while the 
staff and the applicant went back to the drawing board to find the answers 
to questions raised by intervenors or the Board, or to make changes to plant 
designs or procedures to eliminate problems that were exposed by the 
hearing process.24  Thus, the perception that an operating license hearing 
that endured for more than five years was delayed due to the number of 
hearing days is totally without basis.  In fact, then, as now, the applications 
and the staff documents, as lengthy as they may have been, were woefully 
deficient in detail and noticeably lacking in the specifics on issues of 
greatest concern to the intervening public.25  Thus, it is not surprising that 
even today the bulk of the contentions raised in licensing hearings are based 
on the absence of data to support a claim rather than the substantive error in 
the claim itself.  Thus, for instance, in the ongoing hearings regarding the 
 
 21. Llewellyn King, Why Nuclear Power Has Languished, NORTH STAR WRITERS 
GROUP, Sept. 30, 2008, available at http://www.northstarwriters.com/lk066.htm. 
 22. See Klein, supra note 4, at 2. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Paul Gaukler, Address at the American Nuclear Society International Topical 
Meeting on Operating Nuclear Facility Safety: New NRC Hearing Rules – Hard Lessons 
Learned from the Trenches 2 (Nov. 18, 2004). 
 25. See generally id. at 3. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/2
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proposed issuance of new, extended term licenses, for Indian Point 2 and 3, 
of the thirty-two contentions offered by New York State, almost half of the 
contentions are based on the failure of the application to contain 
information required by the law and regulations; of the fifteen contentions 
admitted for consideration by the Board in the hearings, over half are based 
upon the failure of the application to include information required by law or 
regulation.26 
The NRC Staff is also aware that the applications as filed and accepted 
for docketing are seriously deficient.  It devotes months of its efforts to 
submitting requests for additional information (RAIs) to the applicant to 
complete the required details of the application.27  This iterative process is 
not, in and of itself, inappropriate and apparently reflects a serious 
commitment by the NRC Staff to improve the quality of the information it 
must review to make safety determinations.  However, docketing the 
application long before the application is complete, when it often contains 
substantial areas in which the applicant merely promises to address an issue 
at a later date or leaves out most of the significant details of its proposed 
actions, creates the false impression that the time between when the 
application is "docketed" and when a final decision is rendered is 
attributable to the hearing process and public participation.  This "delay" is 
then used to justify even further restrictions on the public's right to 
participate.28 
 
 26. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating 
Units 2 and 3), New York State Notice of Intention to Participate and Petition to Intervene, 
Docket Nos. 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR (Nov. 30, 2007); In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3), Memorandum and Order, 
LBP-08-13, Docket Nos. 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR (July 31, 2008). 
 27. See e.g. Request for Additional Information from the NRC Division of License 
Renewal, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Mr. Michael A. Balduzzi, Sr. Vice 
President and COO Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Subject: Review of the Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Station, License Renewal Application) (Aug. 29, 2007); Requests for 
Additional Information from the NRC Division of License Renewal, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation to Mr. Michael A. Balduzzi, Sr. Vice President and COO Entergy 
Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Subject: Review of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 
2 and 3, License Renewal Application) (Nov. 9, 2007). 
 28. A recent experience regarding the proposal to extend the operating license of the 
Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont, well-illustrates this point.  The 
applicant, Entergy, has being dragging its feet on submitting a complete and accurate 
calculation of the impact of extended operation on metal fatigue.  This problem dates back to 
its original application filed more than three years ago.  After several efforts to produce only 
a partial set of calculations, Entergy was finally ordered in a partial final decision of the 
Licensing Board, to either produce the full calculations or have its license denied.  See In the 
Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LCC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 
(Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Partial Initial Decision (Ruling on Contentions 2A, 2B, 3, 
7
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The effect of these deficiencies in the applications is to prolong the 
time required for processing an application.  More significantly, it also 
places the public at a distinct disadvantage in attempting to meet the ever 
more stringent and rigid requirements to submit admissible contentions for 
hearings.29  As characterized by NRC Staff in its "canned" pleading in 
response to public petitions to participate in the NRC licensing process for 
Indian Point, a contention must clear all of a large group of hurdles before it 
can be accepted for consideration in the hearing.30 
There is a revealing irony in the design of these regulations.  The NRC 
staff, which will have been in contact with the applicant for many months, 
if not years, before the application is filed and will have frequent private 
meetings at which candid exchanges occur and documents are provided, 
and where even so-called proprietary documents are allowed to be viewed, 
is excused from taking a position on the license application until it issues its 
final environmental report and final safety evaluation, often a year or more 
after the notice of opportunity for hearing is filed.31  In fact, the NRC Staff 
does not even have to determine whether it will participate in the hearing 
until after the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB or Board) has 
decided whether to admit any contentions.32  Nonetheless, the public, which 
has no direct access to the applicant and cannot probe the applicant to 
explain its position on any matter and which only has access to the small 
subset of documents which an applicant has chosen to make public, is 
expected to meet all the many hurdles regarding contentions it wishes to file 
within sixty days after notice of filing of the application.33  These hurdles 
include substantial substantive obligations regarding the technical basis for 
disagreement and the evidence upon which such disagreement is based.34 
 
and 4), LBP-08-25, Docket No. 50-271-LR (Nov. 24, 2008) at 151-52.  This has delayed a 
final decision on the application for at least 6 months while Entergy produces the required 
calculations and the parties are allowed to submit new contentions based on the new 
calculations.  In its records of how long it takes to issue final decisions on license renewal 
applications, NRC makes no effort to identify who is the cause of the delay but critics of 
public participation use those statistics to urge even more restrictions on public participation. 
 29. See generally 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f) (2008). 
 30. See, e.g., In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations (Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Units 2 and 3), NRC Staff’s Response to Petitions for Leave to Intervene Filed 
by (1) Westchester Citizen’s Awareness Network, Rockland County Conservation 
Association, Public Health and Sustainable Energy, Sierra Club-Atlantic Chapter, and 
Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, and (2) Friends United for Sustainable Energy, USA, 
Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR (Jan. 22, 2008). 
 31. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.332(b), (d) (2008). 
 32. Id. § 2.1202(b)(1). 
 33. Id. § 2.309(b)(3). 
 34. Id. § 2.309(f). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/2
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How can it be fair or in aid of full public participation to impose on the 
public a high burden of production and proof as a prerequisite to 
participation in a licensing hearing when such a standard is not even applied 
to the NRC Staff with its vast array of legal and technical resources?  No 
objective observer would see this for anything other than what it is – a 
deliberate and calculated plan to deprive the public of participation rights in 
NRC proceedings by imposing unreasonable and often unachievable 
evidentiary burdens as prerequisites to participation.  Although some of 
these requirements have been partially challenged in Citizens Awareness 
Network v. United States35 and the requirements have been upheld, no court 
has yet been confronted with a fully briefed challenge to the contention 
requirements as applied to a particular case.  Such a challenge is likely to 
produce a far different result if the putative public participant makes a 
record of the inherent impossibility of meeting the standards as insisted 
upon by the NRC Staff.36 
Persuasive evidence of the true motives of the NRC is well illustrated 
by the attitude of its Regulatory Staff to attempts by the public to participate 
in decisions relevant to the NRC.  In two recent examples, the Staff 
demonstrated an overt contempt for public participation by states and 
Indian tribes, in proceedings that directly affect their interests, by raising 
 
 35. Citizens Awareness Network v. United States, 391 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 36. An important ameliorating influence on the harsh application of these regulations has 
been the rule of reason that the ASLB has imposed when interpreting the regulations.  See, 
e.g., In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 
and 3), Order (Granting Riverkeeper, Inc.’s Motion and Amending Briefing Schedule), 
Docket Nos. 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR (Apr. 9, 2008); In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Memorandum and Order (Authorizing Interested Governmental Entities to 
Participate in this Proceeding) (Granting in Part Riverkeeper’s Motion for Clarification and 
Reconsideration of the Board’s Ruling in LBP-08-13 Related to the Admissibility of 
Riverkeeper Contention EC-2) (Denying Riverkeeper’s Request to Admit Amended 
Contention EC-2 and New Contentions EC-4 and EC-5) (Denying Entergy’s Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Board’s Decision to Admit Riverkeeper Contention EC-3 and 
Clearwater Contention EC-1), Docket Nos. 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR (Dec. 18, 2008).  
However, as encouraging as this is for those participating in the process, so long as the 
Commissioners hold the ultimate power on these matters and use it to squelch contentions 
which are otherwise sound and reasonable with hyper-technical and disingenuous analyses, 
as it has done in several cases, see In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC 
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-07-13, Docket No. 50-271-LR (Mar. 15 
2007), the rule of reason adopted by the ASLB will have little lasting effect and the 
Commission’s more draconian view of its own regulations will have the desired effect of 
chilling public participation by warning those who try to participate that all their efforts, 
regardless of the correctness of their concerns, may go for naught because of some technical 
requirements that could not be reasonably met. 
9
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hyper-technical objections to their attempts to be part of the process.37  
NRC Staff questioned the authority of the general counsel of the Prairie 
Island Indian Tribe to represent the tribe as a party in the proceeding, and 
demanded that counsel, contrary to the rules that apply to all other parties, 
provide an affidavit from a tribal officer confirming that he had authority to 
represent the tribe.38  Not surprisingly, the Board had no problem easily 
disposing of this claim by NRC Staff.39 
In a recently filed appeal by the NRC Staff to a ruling of the ASLB in 
Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LCC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, 
Inc. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station),40 several states sought to file an 
amicus brief in opposition to the appeal based upon the fact that the issue 
which the Staff sought to challenge was also an issue in licensing 
proceedings in which they were parties.41  NRC Staff opposed the filing on 
several highly technical grounds, including the fact that the states had not 
previously sought to intervene in the Vermont Yankee proceeding, that they 
did not sufficiently detail how their participation as an amicus would be 
beneficial to the Commission, and that their participation would set a 
precedent that would allow states to "jump from proceeding to proceeding 
in an effort to further their plant-specific interests," as though it were 
undesirable for a state to seek to protect its interest in a specific case by 
participating in the resolution of issues that were directly relevant to those 
interest in another case.42  But most disturbingly, the Staff, in its zeal to 
prevent public participation by these interested states, cited to the Atomic 
Energy Act provision that assures states the right to participate in licensing 
 
 37. In the Matter of Nuclear Management Company, LLC (Prairie Island Nuclear 
Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), NRC Staff’s Answer to the Prairie Island Community’s 
Petition for Leave to Intervene, Docket Nos. 50-282-LR, 50-306-LR (Sept. 12, 2008). 
 38. Id. at 6; In the Matter of Northern States Power Co. (formerly Nuclear Management 
Company, LLC) (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), Memorandum and 
Order (Ruling on Petition to Intervene, Request for Hearing, and Motion to Strike), LBP-08-
26, Docket Nos. 50-282-LR, 50-306-LR, at 7-9 (Dec. 5, 2008). 
 39. Northern States Power Co., LBP-08-26, at 7-9. 
 40. NRC Staff’s Petition for Review of the Licensing Board’s Partial Initial Decision, 
LBP-08-25, Docket No. 50-271-LR (Dec. 9, 2008). 
 41. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC, Motion for Leave by the 
States of New York and Connecticut, Hudson Riverkeeper, Inc., Hudson River Sloop 
Clearwater, Inc., and the Prairie Island Indian Community to Submit Brief Amicus Curiae in 
Opposition to Staff’s Petition for Review and in Support of Intervenors State of Vermont and 
the New England Coalition, Docket No. 50-271-LR (Dec. 19, 2008). 
 42. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC, NRC Staff’s Reply to 
Motion to Submit Brief Amicus Curiae, Docket No. 50-271-LR, at 3 (Dec. 23, 2008). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/2
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proceedings by selectively quoting an excerpt from that statute that 
distorted its plain meaning.43 
The provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2021(l) guarantee every state the right to 
participate in NRC licensing decisions: 
With respect to each application for Commission license authorizing 
an activity as to which the Commission's authority is continued 
pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the Commission shall give 
prompt notice to the State or States in which the activity will be 
conducted of the filing of the license application; and shall afford 
reasonable opportunity for State representatives to offer evidence, 
interrogate witnesses, and advise the Commission as to the 
application without requiring such representatives to take a position 
for or against the granting of the application.44 
The obligation to give notice to a state is limited to the state in which the 
activity will occur.45  However, the "reasonable opportunity for State 
representatives to offer evidence, interrogate witnesses, and advise the 
Commission" applies to "State representatives," appears in a phrase 
separated by a semicolon from the "notice" phrase and is not limited to a 
state in which the facility is located.46  NRC Staff in quoting from this 
provision and arguing that it is limited to states in which the facility is 
located, provided the following truncated version of the statute: 
The Commission shall give prompt notice to the State or States in 
which the activity will be conducted of the filing . . . [of an 
application] and shall afford reasonable opportunity . . . for the State 
to . . . advise the Commission with regard to the application.47 
By truncating the citation and leaving out the semicolon, Staff gives the 
misleading impression that the state, which receives notice of Commission 
action, is the only state that has a right to advise the Commission. 
These examples of the Staff's crabbed view of the rules and regulations 
that govern public participation are hardly in step with the Commission’s 
 
 43. Id. at 3-4. 
 44. Atomic Energy Act § 274(l), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(l) (2006). 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC and Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), NRC Staff’s Reply to Motion to 
Submit Brief Amicus Curiae, Docket No. 50-271-LR, at 3-4 (Dec. 23, 2008). 
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oft-expressed, but rarely implemented, goal of encouraging public 
participation in NRC decisions. 
IV.  PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROVIDES VALUABLE 
ADDITIONS TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 
If public participation were substantively valueless, as people like 
Llewellyn King, the nuclear industry, and many at the NRC believe, then 
restricting that participation would be of much less consequence.  But the 
available evidence strongly rejects that assumption. 
As early as 1974, when faced with a broadside attack on the value of 
public participation in NRC licensing decisions, the Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Appeal Board (since abolished by the Commission), drawing on 
its substantial experience with individual licensing decisions and their 
evidentiary records, recognized the contribution of public participation to 
nuclear safety: 
Our own experience – garnered in the course of the review of initial 
decisions and underlying records in an appreciable number of 
contested cases – teaches that the generalization [that public 
participation contributes nothing to safety] has no foundation in fact.  
Public participation in licensing proceedings not only "can provide 
valuable assistance to the adjudicatory process," but on frequent 
occasions demonstrably has done so.  It does no disservice to the 
diligence of either applicants generally or the regulatory staff to note 
that many of the substantial safety and environmental issues which 
have received the scrutiny of licensing boards and appeal boards 
were raised in the first instance by an intervenor.48 
As recently as this last summer, Michael Farrar, an NRC hearing 
officer who has been serving as an NRC Judge for over thirty years, 
reaffirmed the valuable contribution that is made to NRC safety and 
environmental reviews by public participation: 
The Petitioners were instrumental in focusing the Board's attention 
on the troubling matters discussed above. That they did so is a 
testament to the contribution that they, and others like them, can 
 
 48. In the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), 
ALAB-183, Docket Nos. 50-458 and 50-459, 7 A.E.C. 222, 227-28 (Mar. 12, 1974) (citing 
Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-125, 
RAI-73-5 371, 374 n.13 (May 25, 1973)) (footnote omitted). 
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make to a proceeding.  Moreover, in doing so they often labor under 
a number of disadvantages.49 
These views were acknowledged by Chairman Klein, who recently stated 
that the NRC "continue[s] to emphasize the value of regulatory openness by 
ensuring that our decisions are made in consultation with the public, our 
Congress, and other stakeholders."50  He continued, "[w]e view nuclear 
regulation as the public's business and, as such, we believe it should be 
transacted as openly and candidly as possible."51  Nonetheless, while the 
NRC today gives lip service to the value of public participation, its every 
action reflects a deep disdain for the usefulness of the public input on 
matters of safety or environmental protection. Yet, as the ASLAB 
recognized in the River Bend case, intervenors have raised important safety 
and environmental issues that, but for their involvement, would not have 
been addressed in the NRC safety and environmental review.52 
But has public confidence in nuclear power increased?  Since, as 
Chairman Klein has declared, it is the goal of the new NRC tactics to 
increase public confidence in nuclear power, it is worth looking at that issue 
to see if there is in fact increasing public confidence in nuclear power.  One 
measure of the public attitude regarding nuclear power is how politicians 
view the issue.  In recent years, an increasing number of elected officials 
have been raising serious questions about nuclear reactor safety.  One of the 
leading public officials challenging nuclear power is Andrew Cuomo, 
Attorney General of New York State, who has expressed his unalterable 
opposition to the further operation of Indian Point and whose staff has filed 
one of the largest and most comprehensive challenges to a proposed license 
 
 49. In the Matter of Shaw Areva Mox Services (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), 
LB-08-11, Docket No. 70-3098-MLA, at 49 (June 27, 2008) (Farrar, J., concurring). 
 50. Dale E. Klein, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Presentation to the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety: The U.S. National Report, at Slide 3 (Apr. 15, 2008), 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/; see also The Honorable 
Gregory B. Jaczko, Comm’r, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Remarks to the Regulatory 
Information Conference: Guiding Principles: Culture, Transparency, and Communication 
(Mar. 9, 2005), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/; The Honorable 
Gregory B. Jaczko, Comm’r, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Remarks to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Nuclear Energy Agency 
Workshop on the Transparency of Nuclear Regulatory Activities: Openness and 
Transparency-The Road to Public Confidence (May 22, 2007), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/commission/. 
 51. Klein, supra note 50, at Slide 11. 
 52. In the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), 
ALAB-183, Docket Nos. 50-458 and 50-459, 7 A.E.C. 222, 227-28 (Mar. 12, 1974). 
13
ROISMAN 8/5/2009  12:31 AM 
330 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  26 
renewal.53  Attorneys General in many other states are adding their voices 
of concern, including Massachusetts, Connecticut, California, and Nevada, 
to mention only a few.  Similarly, President Barack Obama has endorsed 
the use of nuclear power only if high level waste disposal and critical safety 
problems can be resolved.54 
Increasing numbers of citizen organizations are mounting challenges 
to nuclear plant proposals and to NRC decisions. In one recent decision, 
Massachusetts v. United States,55 the First Circuit expressed some concern 
that the NRC would actually obey the procedural interpretations it placed 
on its own regulations in order to prevail in the case and gave this unusual 
warning to the NRC: 
Further, if the agency were to act contrary to these representations in 
this matter, a reviewing court would most likely consider such 
actions to be arbitrary and capricious.56 
Those are not the words of a court that has a lot of confidence in the NRC 
or its credibility. 
But Chairman Klein has indicated that the key to public confidence is 
high standards.  He may be right, but the NRC record is anything but 
evidence of high standards or, more importantly, of vigorous enforcement 
of those standards.  Peter Bradford, the former NRC Commissioner and 
internationally recognized energy expert, compiled the following list of 
some of the more notorious lapses by NRC in its oversight and regulatory 
responsibilities, just in the last seven years: 
1.   January 7, 2003 – A New York Times story reported that the 
NRC had ruled that terrorism was too speculative to be considered in 
NRC licensing proceedings, even as the Bush administration and 
Congress considered terrorism likely enough to suspend habeas 
corpus and commit torture.  This position has since been rejected by 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but the NRC continues to apply it 
elsewhere. – The original staff testimony taking this position in 
 
 53. Press Release, New York State Executive Chamber, Governor Spitzer & Attorney 
General Cuomo Announce Effort to Halt Indian Point Relicensing (Dec. 3, 2007), 
http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/1203072.html. 
 54. Stephen Power, In Energy Policy, McCain, Obama Differ on Role of Government, 
WALL ST. J., June 9, 2008, at A2.  See also Environment & Energy Daily which reported on 
April 22, 2009 (“No new nuclear or coal plants may ever be needed in the United States, the 
chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission said today. ‘We may not need any, 
ever,’ Jon Wellinghoff told reporters at a U.S. Energy Association forum.”). 
 55. Massachusetts v. United States, 522 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 56. Id. at 130. 
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opposition to an intervenor contention was submitted on September 
12, 2001, one day after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon.  The licensing board wanted to admit the 
contention despite the staff opposition but was overruled by the 
commission. 
2.   A 2002 survey of NRC employees says that 40% would be 
scared to raise significant safety questions.  Then Chairman Richard 
Meserve said this was a big improvement from the 50% of five years 
earlier. 
3.   From a New York Times editorial of January 7, 2003 –  
"Unfortunately, the regulatory agency that was supposed to ride herd 
on unsafe plants was equally negligent. A report just released by the 
NRC's inspector general concludes that the regulatory staff was slow 
to order Davis-Besse to shut down for inspection, in large part 
because it did not want to impose unnecessary costs on the owner 
and did not want to give the industry a black eye. Although the NRC 
insists that safety remains its top priority, its timidity in this case 
cries out for a searching Congressional inquiry into whether the 
regulators can still be counted on to protect the public from cavalier 
reactor operators." 
4.   In 2003 the NRC submitted the name of Sam Collins, the 
official who had overseen the Davis Besse shutdown delay, to the 
Office of Personnel for the highest civilian financial award, a 35% 
bonus.  During the time covered by the award, the NRC inspector 
general also concluded that Collins had knowing[ly] inserted a false 
statement into a letter sent by the NRC chair to David Lochbaum at 
the Union of Concerned Scientists. As Lochbaum observed at the 
time, "The NRC has a safety culture problem. The survey released 
last December showed that only 51% of the workers felt comfortable 
raising safety concerns. The Commission can only reinforce the fears 
by rewarding a person who has falsified documents, chided those 
who did their jobs, and taken repeated steps to undermine safe." 
5.   Immediately after the September 11th attacks, the NRC rushed 
out a claim that nuclear power plants were designed to withstand 
such crashes.  This claim, which had no basis, was later withdrawn. 
6.   Two unprecedented speeches by Commissioner Edward 
McGaffigan attacking groups with a history of responsible 
participation in NRC proceedings. 
15
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7.   The claim by Senator Pete Domenici that he had successfully 
persuaded the NRC to reverse its "adversarial attitude" toward the 
nuclear industry by threatening to cut its budget by one-third during a 
1998 meeting with the chair (from PETE V. DOMENICI, A BRIGHTER 
TOMORROW: FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 74-75 
(Rowman and Littlefield 2004)). 
8.   Current NRC chair, Dale Klein, appeared in industry-funded 
advertisements attesting to the safety of Yucca Mountain.  When 
Commissioner Jaczko was appointed from the staff of Nevada 
Senator Harry Reid, he was required to take no part in Yucca 
Mountain matters for a year or two.  No such requirement was placed 
on Klein. 
9.   The NRC has eviscerated the opportunities for public 
participation that existed 15-20 years ago.  To give but one of many 
examples, lawyers can no longer cross examine but must submit their 
questions to the licensing board chair, who decides whether or not to 
ask them. 
10.   The top U.S. nuclear regulator vouched for the safety of a new 
Westinghouse nuclear reactor – yet to be built anywhere in the world 
– in a sales pitch to supply China's growing power industry. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Nils Diaz said that the 
$1.5 billion AP1000 reactor made by Westinghouse Electric Co. is 
"likely to receive regulatory approval in the next few months."57 
 The NRC's own Inspector General discovered that NRC Staff was 
copying into its reports on plant license renewal applications verbatim 
sections of the application itself, without attribution, and then, when the 
Inspector General went to test the Staff assertion that its review was 
thorough, even if its report writing was deficient, it was discovered the Staff 
had destroyed all the documents that allegedly demonstrated the 
thoroughness of its "independent" review.58 
 
 57. Email from Peter Bradford, former member of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, to Anthony Roisman (Jan. 15, 2009) (containing the text of a letter from 
Congressman Peter Welch to Congressman Henry Waxman outlining Bradford’s concerns) 
(on file with author). 
 58. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, AUDIT OF 
NRC’S LICENSE RENEWAL PROGRAM (OIG-07-A-15) 8-11, 15-16 (2007), available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-gen/; see also Memorandum from 
Hubert T. Bell, Inspector Gen., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, to Dale E. Klein, 
Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, NRC Staff Review of License Renewal 
Applications (May 2, 2008). 
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In 2008 Judge Farrar raised concerns about whether the NRC Staff was 
primarily committed to a safety culture or whether its primary motivation 
was to "do it faster" using two startling examples from the Shaw Areva Mox 
Services case before the ASLB, where safety was clearly not a paramount 
concern.59  Judge Farrar noted that 1) the Staff initially supported allowing 
a decision on an operating license to proceed to final decision even though 
the construction of the facility had not yet begun, much less been 
completed, as required by NRC regulations and 2) was willing to ignore the 
requirements written into its own Safety Evaluation Report as part of the 
construction permit process and allow the facility to proceed without 
compliance with those requirements. 60 
These events caused Judge Farrar to reach this conclusion: 
The approaches the Staff took to two matters during this proceeding 
appear to raise concerns about the robustness of the agency's internal 
safety culture. Perhaps those two matters were aberrational, and can 
be explained away as of little broader consequence. But, on the other 
hand, they may be symptomatic of safety culture deficiencies, and 
thus raise a serious question about a foundation of nuclear safety – 
the culture of the government organization responsible for promoting 
it.61 
To date, there is no evidence that the NRC Staff or the Commission 
has taken any steps to find the root cause of these serious lapses in NRC 
Staff commitment to safety nor taken steps toward identifying the root 
causes of NRC Staff decisions that seek to so seriously undermine its own 
obligation to safety. 
Finally, the nuclear industry itself has changed in the last decade.  
With the advent of electric power deregulation and consolidation of nuclear 
power plant ownership into a handful of companies, there are new and 
ample opportunities for profits to trump safety and, regrettably, ample 
examples of laxness among the nuclear power plant owners.  Before 
deregulation and the rise of "absentee" ownership of nuclear power plants, a 
local utility, with roots in the community and under a regulatory regime 
based on a guaranteed rate of return on capital and operating costs, an 
owner had no reason not to spend the money necessary to provide the best 
 
 59. In the Matter of Shaw Areva Mox Services (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility) 
Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Contentions and all Other Pending Matters), LB-08-11, 
Docket No. 70-3098-MLA (June 27, 2008) (Farrar, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. at 45-48. 
 61. Id. at 46. 
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quality safety equipment and operating procedures.  Now, as "merchant" 
owners, nuclear plant operators are: 1) selling power in competition with 
other forms of energy; 2) entering into fixed priced, long term power sale 
agreements to satisfy local public utility commissions focused primarily on 
protecting the pocketbook of electricity customers; and, 3) seeing the size of 
their profit margin directly affected by how much money they spend on 
safety, how much money they spend on license applications, how large their 
plant staff is and how quickly they can complete work that requires the 
plants to be off line.  While all these are laudable goals, they must not be 
allowed to over-shadow the principle goal of nuclear safety.  Is that what is 
happening? 
Without a vigorous and committed NRC Regulatory Staff fulfilling its 
duties as a safety watchdog, there is no comforting answer to that question.  
What is known is that over the last twenty years, the capacity factor for 
nuclear power plants has risen from the low sixties to the low nineties and 
there is no way to attribute that 50% improvement solely to a more 
efficient, and still safe, refueling process or other management initiatives 
implemented by the utilities.62  Certainly, one significant factor is that 
during that time period the NRC severely restricted the use of backfitting, 
i.e. the imposition, after construction or operation has begun, of safety 
improvements based upon new research resolving previously unresolved 
safety issues or addressing the occurrence of unanticipated safety problems 
such as fuel densification, the Browns Ferry fire or Three Mile Island.63 
The backfit procedure was used to compensate for the fact that all nuclear 
plants were licensed with substantial unresolved safety issues and that the 
fair price for that expediency was to backfit the nuclear plants with new 
safety equipment and procedures when resolution of the safety issue 
showed that such an upgrade was warranted. 
The backfit standard used to be that if resolution of a previously 
unresolved safety problem demonstrated that a safety improvement was 
warranted, it was required.  Now that safety improvement is only required if 
the Commission finds that there is: 
A substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health 
and safety or the common defense and security to be derived from 
 
 62. NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, U.S. NUCLEAR GENERATING STATISTICS 1971-2007, 
http://www.nei.org. 
 63. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 (2008). 
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the backfit and that the direct and indirect costs of implementation 
for that facility are justified in view of this increased protection.64 
How does the NRC justify shifting the burden from the utility, to 
demonstrate that a safety backfit is not required, to the NRC, to justify that 
a backfit will provide a "substantial increase in the overall protection of the 
public health and safety" and how does the NRC justify allowing the cost of 
a safety improvement to be a factor in deciding whether to require it?  At a 
minimum, such a drastic change in, and reduction of, safety requirements 
should have been proceeded by a thorough and publicly discussed analysis 
in the context of an adjudicatory hearing that demonstrated: that nuclear 
power had advanced sufficiently to be able to decisively conclude that the 
plants that had already been licensed were "safe" for their full term; that no 
important unresolved safety problems existed; and, that the industry had 
reached sufficient maturity to justify such a change.  No such public 
hearings have been held and no such findings have been made.  There is 
evidence that the nuclear industry is anything but "mature:" sleeping 
guards, corroding pressure vessels and a shocking lack of candor by nuclear 
plant-owners65 all suggest that, at best, the nuclear industry has morphed 
from an unsophisticated and nuclear naive child to a rebellious teenager, 
more in need of controls today than ever before. 
In short, the public has much less confidence in nuclear power today 
than it did several decades ago and there is ample reason for such 
skepticism with a profit aggressive nuclear industry and a reluctant NRC 
regulator. 
V.  THE NEW HEARING REGULATIONS ARE NOT MORE 
EFFICIENT 
Even though the NRC has wrongly blamed public participation as a 
major source of the nuclear industry's problems and ignored the evidence 
that public participation "not only 'can provide valuable assistance to the 
 
 64. Id. § 50.109(a)(3). 
 65. E.g., Sharon Dunwoody et al After Environmental Accidents, Public Deserves 
Candor, THE SCIENTIST, Apr. 15, 1991, at 11; JOAN B. ARON, LICENSED TO KILL? THE 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND THE SHOREHAM POWER PLANT 8 (1998); U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR REGULATION: NRC NEEDS TO MORE AGGRESSIVELY AND 
COMPREHENSIVELY RESOLVE ISSUES RELATED TO DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT’S 
SHUTDOWN (GAO-04-415) (May 2004); Steven Mufson, Video of Sleeping Guards Shakes 
Nuclear Industry, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 4, 2008, at A01. 
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adjudicatory process', but on frequent occasions demonstrably has"66 done 
so, and even though the NRC has totally failed to increase public 
confidence in the safety and benefit of nuclear power due to its own lapses 
in regulatory oversight and the nuclear industries own shortcomings, has the 
NRC achieved its stated goal of making the nuclear licensing process more 
efficient? Again, the evidence is compelling that the nuclear licensing 
process has become less efficient, more convoluted, and ultimately vastly 
more vulnerable to attack in court as a result of misguided and, in many 
instances, just plain irrational changes to the NRC licensing process. 
The core of the changes implemented by the NRC were to impose a 
series of barriers to any member of the public able to participate in the 
hearing process and inflict severe limitations on the issues that could be 
raised in the licensing hearing, including both substantive and procedural 
barriers. One of the more complete explanations of this draconian procedure 
is provided in the essentially canned analysis provided by NRC Staff in its 
opposition to the bulk, if not all, of the contentions proposed in license 
renewal proceedings.  The following is taken from the NRC Staff's January 
22, 2008, filing in the Indian Point relicensing hearings: 
A. Legal Requirements for Contentions 
1.   General Requirements. 
The legal requirements governing the admissibility of contentions are well 
established, and currently are set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f) of the 
Commission's Rules of Practice (formerly § 2.714(b)).  Specifically, in 
order to be admitted, a contention must satisfy the following requirements: 
(f) Contentions.   
(1) A request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene must set forth 
with particularity the contentions sought to be raised.  For each 
contention, the request or petition must: 
(i) Provide a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised 
or controverted; 
(ii) Provide a brief explanation of the basis for the contention; 
(iii) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention is within the 
scope of the proceeding; 
(iv) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention is material to 
the findings the NRC must make to support the action that is involved 
in the proceeding; 
 
 66. In the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), 
ALAB-183, Docket Nos. 50-458 and 50-459, 7 A.E.C. 222, 227-28 (Mar. 12, 1974). 
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(v) Provide a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinions 
which support the requestor's/petitioner's position on the issue and on 
which the petitioner intends to rely at hearing, together with 
references to the specific sources and documents on which the 
requestor/petitioner intends to rely to support its position on the issue; 
and 
(vi) Provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute 
exists with the applicant/licensee on a material issue of law or fact.  
This information must include references to specific portions of the 
application (including the applicant's environmental report and safety 
report) that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each 
dispute, or, if the petitioner believes that the application fails to 
contain information on a relevant matter as required by law, the 
identification of each failure and the supporting reasons for the 
petitioner's belief. 
(2) Contentions must be based on documents or other information 
available at the time the petition is to be filed, such as the application, 
supporting safety analysis report, environmental report or other 
supporting document filed by an applicant or licensee, or otherwise 
available to a petitioner. On issues arising under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, the petitioner shall file contentions based on the 
applicant's environmental report . . . 
10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)-(2). 
The Licensing Board in this proceeding has previously addressed 
these standards at length, in its Orders denying certain petitions to 
intervene for failure to state an admissible contention.  The 
Licensing Board summarized the standards in 10 C.F.R. § 
2.309(f)(1), as follows: 
An admissible contention must: (1) provide a specific statement of the 
legal or factual issue sought to be raised; (2) provide a brief explanation of 
the basis for the contention; (3) demonstrate that the issue raised is within 
the scope of the proceeding; (4) demonstrate that the issue raised is 
material to the findings the NRC must make to support the action that is 
involved in the proceeding; (5) provide a concise statement of the alleged 
facts or expert opinions, including references to specific sources and 
documents, that support the petitioner's position and upon which the 
petitioner intends to rely at the hearing; and (6) provide sufficient 
information to show that a genuine dispute exists with regard to a material 
issue of law or fact, including references to specific portions of the 
application that the petitioner disputes, or in the case when the application 
21
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is alleged to be deficient, the identification of such deficiencies and 
supporting reasons for this belief.  
Memorandum and Order (Denying the Village of Buchanan's 
Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene) (Dec. 5, 2007), slip op. at 
3; footnote omitted.  As the Licensing Board further observed, 
sound legal and policy considerations underlie the Commission's 
contention requirements: 
The purpose of the contention rule is to "focus litigation on concrete 
issues and result in a clearer and more focused record for decision."  The 
Commission has stated that it "should not have to expend resources to 
support the hearing process unless there is an issue that is appropriate for, 
and susceptible to, resolution in an NRC hearing." The Commission has 
emphasized that the rules on contention admissibility are "strict by 
design."  Failure to comply with any of these requirements is grounds for 
the dismissal of a contention. 
 Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted). 
The requirements governing the admissibility of contentions have 
been strictly applied in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including 
license renewal proceedings.  For example, in a recent decision 
involving license renewal, the Commission stated: 
To intervene in a Commission proceeding, including a license renewal 
proceeding, a person must file a petition for leave to intervene. In 
accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a), this petition must demonstrate 
standing under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d), and must proffer at least one 
admissible contention as required by 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(f)(1)(i)-(vi). The 
requirements for admissibility set out in 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(f)(1)(i)-(vi) 
are "strict by design," and we will reject any contention that does not 
satisfy these requirements.  Our rules require "a clear statement as to the 
basis for the contentions and the submission of . . . supporting information 
and references to specific documents and sources that establish the 
validity of the contention."  "Mere 'notice pleading' does not suffice."  
Contentions must fall within the scope of the proceeding – here, license 
renewal – in which intervention is sought. 
Amergen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating 
Station), CLI-06-24, 64 NRC 111, 118-119 (2006); footnotes 
omitted; emphasis added. 
Finally, it is well established that the purpose for the basis 
requirements is (1) to assure that the contention raises a matter 
appropriate for adjudication in a particular proceeding; (2) to 
establish a sufficient foundation for the contention to warrant further 
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inquiry into the assertion; and (3) to put other parties sufficiently on 
notice of the issues so that they will know generally what they will 
have to defend against or oppose.  Peach Bottom, supra, 8 AEC at 
20-21.67 
The use of terms such as "strict," "sufficient," "demonstrate," and similar 
admonitions underscores the rigidity with which NRC Staff and the 
Commission interpret these requirements.  What is most notable is that in 
imposing the requirements for safety or even procedural requirements on 
the applicant, no similar rigidity is displayed.  For example, pursuant to 10 
C.F.R. § 54.13, all applications for license renewal must be "complete and 
accurate in all material respects."68  Anyone who has participated in a 
license renewal proceeding knows how this requirement is ignored and how 
applicants are allowed to make major, substantive additions to their 
applications long after the application has been accepted and docketed by 
the NRC Staff.  Perhaps the most notable of these afterthought amendments 
is the one that Entergy routinely files when it is challenged for its failure to 
demonstrate, as required by the regulations, that it has an aging 
management plan to address metal fatigue during extended license 
operation.69  A similar laxity is evident in the manner in which NRC Staff, 
almost every month, grants an exemption under 10 C.F.R. § 50.12 from the 
safety standards imposed by 10 C.F.R. Part 50 because an applicant finds it 
too difficult or expensive to meet the requirements and offers a technically 
facile analysis to justify its entitlement to an exemption.  If, as the NRC 
Staff and Commission delight in reminding intervenors, the requirements 
for public participation are "strict by design," fairness and good policy 
would dictate that safety regulations and filing requirements for applicants 
should also be "strict by design." 
Of course, there have been hearings where issues were raised that 
lacked substantive merit and questions were asked that were pointless, but 
there are ample ways to prevent or substantially reduce such occurrences 
without excluding legitimate concerns about nuclear plant safety because of 
 
 67. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating 
Units 1 and 2), NRC Staff’s Response to Petitions for Leave to Intervene Filed by (1) 
Westchester Citizen’s Awareness Network, Rockland County Conservation Association, 
Public Health and Sustainable Energy, Sierra Club – Atlantic Chapter, and Assemblyman 
Richard Brodsky, and (2) Friends for United Sustainable Energy, USA), Docket Nos. 50-
247LR and 50-286-LR, at 23-27 (Jan. 22, 2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 68. 10 C.F.R. § 54.13 (2008). 
 69. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Partial Initial Decision (Ruling on 
Contentions 2A, 2B, 3, and 4), LBP-08-25, Docket No. 50-271-LR (Nov. 24, 2008). 
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hyper-technical regulations and hyper-strict implementation of those 
regulations. The effects of these highly restrictive entry requirements have 
become evident to NRC's independent judges who see these requirements in 
action every day and who also have the best vantage point to judge the 
value of public participation.70  One of the most pernicious aspects of the 
hearing regulations is the use of time limits as a one-way restriction to 
disadvantage the public.71  In essence, any prospective intervenor who does 
not raise every conceivable contention within the sixty day time period 
allotted for filing intervention petitions must face the additional hurdle of 
justifying a "late filed" contention even if the late filed contention is 
necessitated by the late filed application amendment or information from 
the applicant.72  There are no restrictions on when the applicant can file its 
license amendment or when the Staff must complete its safety or 
environmental reviews.  However, there are strict deadlines on how soon 
after the amendment is filed when an intervenor must file a contention 
based on that amendment.  This situation provides numerous opportunities 
for applicants and the NRC Staff to "game" the system to the detriment of 
public participation.73 
For example, when Entergy filed its application for license renewal at 
Vermont Yankee, it left out of the application the crucial information on 
 
 70. In the Matter of Shaw Areva Mox Services (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility) 
Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Contentions and all Other Pending Matters), LB-08-11, 
Docket No. 70-3098-MLA, at 45, 49-58 (June 27, 2008) (Farrar, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. at 55-58. 
 72. 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(c), (f)(2)(iii) (2008). 
 73. A recent filing in the Indian Point relicensing proceeding illustrates the point.  The 
staff sent its draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (DSEIS) to the applicant 
on December 22, 2008.  See Notice of Availability to Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. from 
the NRC Division of License Renewal, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (Subject: The 
Draft Plant-Specific Supplement 38 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement For 
License Renewal of Nuclear Plants (GEIS) Regarding Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 
Nos. 2 and 3) (Dec. 22, 2008). The applicant argued that a January 9, 2009, request for an 
extension of time to file contentions based on that filing was untimely because it should have 
been filed on January 2, 2009, in accordance with the ten-day time limit to file a motion 
based on an event.  See In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point 
Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3), Entergy’s Answer to NYS and Riverkeeper’s Motions 
for Extension of Time to File Contentions Related to Draft SEIS, Docket Nos. 50-247-LR 
and 50-268-LR (Jan. 12, 2009); 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(a) (2008). The Commission provides no 
allowance for intervening holidays or weekends so Christmas, Christmas weekend and New 
Years are ignored.  This left the party seeking to file a motion for an extension of time to file 
new contentions based on the DSEIS less than five working days.  It is unlikely that the 
filing of the DSEIS on December 22, was a mere accident, particularly since the filing was 
more than a month after the date the Staff indicated the document would be filed, having 
granted itself an extension of time without the need to ask permission from anyone. 
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how it would address the issue of metal fatigue during the extended license 
period.74  It listed three options, any one of which it might choose to 
implement in the future.75  A contention based on the deficiency in any one 
of those approaches would be attacked as premature and speculative, since 
Entergy had not yet decided which approach to take.  Thus, the only 
arguably "admissible" contention was one that criticized the application for 
not having a program.76  Of course, once that contention was admitted, the 
applicant then chose one of the methodologies - it would recalculate the 
metal fatigue numbers to show they were not excessive but the actual 
recalculation was not provided.77  Entergy filed its "final" recalculation, 
which the intervenor's expert promptly eviscerated.78  Entergy then had to 
redo the recalculation (called a confirmatory analysis) and a new 
contention, which was opposed, had to be filed, and was allowed.79 The 
NRC Staff joined in Entergy's opposition.  Eventually, the Board found that 
additional calculations for other components had to be completed and were 
subject to challenge in the hearing, not deferred until the hearing was 
concluded as Entergy urged.80  This illustrates how wasteful and inefficient 
a process is, which allows an incomplete application to trigger a contention 
filing obligation and then subjects the public to even greater barriers when 
it seeks to raise issues when they are ripe and which could not have been 
raised earlier.  Not surprisingly, but still disappointingly, when NRC 
amended its rules, the only efficiencies with which it was concerned were 
those of applicants, not the public. 
Another example of the absurdity of the "strict by design" procedural 
rules for intervenors and the need to seek leave to file a "late filed 
contention" every time new information is released, is the rule applied to 
challenges to the NRC Staff's environmental impact statement.  Pursuant to 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), every major federal action, 
which includes decisions to license or relicense a nuclear power plant, must 
be preceded by an environmental impact statement.81  The final is always 
preceded by a draft on which public comments are submitted.  Common 
 
 74. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Partial Initial Decision (Ruling on 
Contentions 2A, 2B, 3, and 4), LBP-08-25, Docket No. 50-271-LR, at 13 (Nov. 24, 2008). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 14. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 14-15 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
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sense would say that a concerned member of the public should participate 
in the impact statement process by filing comments on the draft but waiting 
to file any contentions challenging the impact statement only after the 
agency has had a chance to consider the comments and to issue its final 
impact statement, modified as it sees fit by considering the public 
comments.  However, the NRC position, relying on 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(a), is 
that all contentions challenging the impact statement are untimely if they 
are not filed shortly after the draft impact statement is issued or unless the 
final impact statement contains positions not previously identifiable from 
the draft.  If, in the final impact statement, the NRC modifies the draft 
impact statement such that the initial contention is no longer accurate, the 
intervenor must file a new contention and meet all the special rules for 
filing such a new contention. 
These problems are complicated by another bizarre requirement.  
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2), environmental contentions arising 
under NEPA must be based on the environmental report filed by the 
applicant, even though the obligations imposed on the applicant are those 
contained in the NRC Regulations, 10 C.F.R part 51 and not those 
contained in NEPA. 82  When the NRC Staff issues a draft impact statement 
under NEPA, contentions can be based on the draft only if it can be shown 
that they are based on information or conclusions that differ significantly 
from the information contained in the applicant's environmental report.  
However, a contention that challenges the applicant's environmental report 
because it does not comply with NEPA is rejected because an applicant 
cannot be required to comply with NEPA.  So, how does a NEPA challenge 
become a contention if the Staff merely parrots what the applicant has said 
in the environmental report? 
These multiple hurdles that intervenors face are not merely annoying, 
they are resource intensive and sap the limited resources of intervenors on 
procedural issues making it less likely they will have resources to address 
the substantive issues.  Because they are procedural hurdles, they also 
challenge the pro se intervenor, without legal assistance, to meet every 
technical requirement, each of which is "strict by design," thus creating 
multiple opportunities for the applicant and NRC Staff to find a "flaw" in 
the intervenor's pleading.  This allows an applicant or NRC Staff to expose 
a procedural misstep, while avoiding a hearing on the substantive concerns 
that have motivated the public participation by the intervenor. 
 
 82. “On issues arising under the National Environmental Policy Act, the petitioner shall 
file contentions based on the applicant's environmental report.” 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2) 
(2008). 
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In a recent concurring opinion, Judge Farrar explored, at length, the 
inequities and inefficiencies in the NRC hearing procedures.83  He focused 
primarily on barriers to the public to entry into the hearing process and 
inappropriate deadlines on the public once the hearing process begins.  He 
reached the following conclusion: 
 
In my view, a set of conditions that fosters these approaches and 
disparities should not have been allowed to continue to develop 
within the bounds of the Commission's adjudicatory system . . . the 
adjudicatory system ought to operate in the way it would if it were 
"really trying" (1) to encourage the participation of those who are 
protected by the Atomic Energy Act's grant of hearing rights and (2) 
to provide them the opportunity for a meaningful hearing.84 
 
Judge Farrar’s comments were echoed by another long time NRC 
hearing judge, Alan Rosenthal, at the outset of an oral argument in nuclear 
waste repository (Yucca Mountain) hearings: 
As the parties to the proceeding are likely aware, I became a 
member of this Board very recently. Upon joining it, I discovered to 
my amazement that the Department of Energy was taking the 
position that not a single one of the 100 -- of the 229 separate 
contentions filed by the State of Nevada was admissible. In addition, 
to my further amazement, I learned that the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission staff had told the Boards that, in its view, only a very 
small number of those 229 contentions met the standards for 
admission contained in the Commission's rules of practice, more 
particularly, Section 2.309(f)(1). That amazement stemmed from the 
fact that, on the face of it, it seemed most unlikely that experienced 
Nevada counsel, which included a former deputy general counsel of 
this agency were unable to come up with even one acceptable 
contention relating to this extraordinarily and unique proposed 
facility. Put another way, I found it difficult offhand to believe that 
Nevada counsel were so unfamiliar with the requirements of section 
2.309(f)(1) that they simple were unable to fashion a single 
contention that met those requirements.  
 
 83. See In the Matter of Shaw Areva Mox Services (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication 
Facility) Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Contentions and all Other Pending Matters), 
LB-08-11, Docket No. 70-3098-MLA, at 45, 49-58 (June 27, 2008) (Farrar, J., concurring). 
 84. Id. at 58, 59. 
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Now, it might turn out that despite this initial reaction, at day's end it 
will be determined by the members of the three boards, myself 
included, that, in fact, none of Nevada's contentions is admissible. In 
that connection, DOE and the NRC staff can be assured that each of 
their objections to the admissibility of contentions will have received 
full consideration by the time of our decision. Should, however, 
upon that full consideration, we conclude that a significant number 
of the Nevada contentions are clearly admissible, with the 
consequence that the objection to their admission was wholly 
insubstantial, for me at least, both DOE and the NRC staff will have 
lost credibility.  
Obviously DOE has an interest in fending off at the threshold as 
much of the opposition to its Yucca Mountain proposal as 
responsibly can be done. It is not responsible conduct, however, to 
interpose objections that are devoid of substance on an apparent 
invocation of the old adage, nothing ventured, nothing gained. 
Insofar as concerns the NRC staff, unlike DOE, it is the regulator, 
not the promoter of the proposal. That being the case, it would be 
even more unseemly for it to interpose to the admission of 
contentions objections that are plainly without substance. Indeed, in 
such circumstances, the staff would, to its detriment, create the 
impression that it is not a disinterested participant in the licensing 
process but rather a spear carrier for DOE. Once such impression has 
been garnered, there would remain little reason to credit anything 
that the staff might have to offer.85  
VI.  TRUNCATED AND CONVOLUTED HEARING 
PROCEDURES 
Even if a member of the public overcomes all the hurdles and actually 
manages to meet the requirements for a hearing, the path to full and fair 
exploration of the few issues that survived the procedural gauntlet is littered 
with potholes and roadside bombs designed to further impede a full 
exploration of the issues pressed by a public participant. Until fairly 
recently, adjudicatory hearings before the NRC provided full use of trial 
type procedures, including discovery tools like interrogatories, document 
production requests, depositions and requests for admissions and the 
availability of cross-examination, during the hearing.  In 2004 the NRC 
 
85.  In the Matter of U.S. Department of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository) Docket 
No. 63-001-HLW, Transcript of Proceedings (Interim Draft) Apr. 1, 2009 at 338-41. 
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drastically changed its hearing regulations to substantially curtail the 
availability of all these procedures.  Its stated reason for the change was "to 
make the NRC's hearing process more effective and efficient."86 What it 
created instead was a labyrinth of confusing and arguably inconsistent 
procedural regulations which create an enormous amount of litigation 
potential over the meaning and application of these regulations.  In addition, 
because the "system" created by NRC has no counterpart in other agencies 
or in federal or state courts, each time an issue arises under the regulations 
it is a case of first impression.  While this "lawyers' full employment act" 
type of regulation may be comforting to the lawyers for license applicants 
who are well-paid for their time, it is an enormous drain on the resources of 
the public to struggle through the regulations to assert their right to full and 
fair hearings.  After four years of the new regime, what is evident is that the 
process is neither effective nor efficient. The following discussion 
illustrates the difficulty a party will face in attempting to assert the right to 
use the full panoply of discovery and hearing procedures in those cases 
where their use is warranted. 
Three statutory provisions address the choice of hearing procedures: 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(l), 2231 and 5 U.S.C. § 556.  Four NRC regulations also 
address the choice of hearing procedures: 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(g), 2.310(d), 
2.336(f), and, to the extent Subpart L is chosen, § 2.1204(b)(3).  The 
underlying rationale behind all of these provisions is that procedures to be 
used in an NRC licensing hearing governed by the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2239(a), which require a hearing in "any proceeding under this chapter, 
for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or 
construction permit . . . upon the request of any person whose interest may 
be affected by the proceeding . . . " shall be those procedures that have been 
shown to be necessary for "resolution of material issues of fact which may 
be best determined through the use of the identified procedures."87 
Although this concept is relatively simple, based on a practical showing of 
the need for particular procedures, NRC has encrusted the concept with a 
series of complicated hurdles that a party must overcome before they can 
get to argue for the use of any of these procedures.  In this way, the NRC 
regulations are neither effective nor efficient and their principal effect is to 
make it virtually impossible for any but the most well-financed members of 
 
 86. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations, Changes to the Adjudicatory Process 
69 Fed. Reg. 2182, 2182 (Jan. 14. 2004). 
 87. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(g) (2008); see also 10 C.F.R. § 2.1204(b)(3) (2008) (cross-
examination allowed under Subpart L where it is shown that it is “necessary to ensure the 
development of an adequate record for decision”). 
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the public to obtain meaningful hearing procedures. The following 
discussion explores the current NRC regulations governing the hearing 
procedures available to a party to the proceeding and the difficulty involved 
in attempting to use these procedures.  Instead of allowing a procedure to be 
used if it's shown that it is the best procedure for the purpose, a series of 
alternative tests have been developed that are not only virtually impossible 
to meet but also depart substantially from the practical test, endorsed by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and ostensibly adopted by the NRC. 
NRC and applicants claim that in the 2004 regulatory amendments, the 
NRC announced two basic principles.  First, by requiring all parties to a 
hearing to disclose all documents relevant to the issues raised in the 
proceeding, the need for any additional discovery would be negligible.88  
Second, the only way to gain the right to ask for additional discovery 
procedures (absent gross misconduct by a party in fulfilling its mandatory 
disclosure obligations)89 is for the hearing board to decide at an early stage 
in the hearing that certain draconian tests have been met to justify placing 
the hearing in a special category where the opportunity to use other 
discovery procedures is available.  In order to carry out its grand plan in 
2004, the NRC created several hearing tracks, called Subparts.  The 
Subparts most relevant to issuance of new extended operating licenses are 
Subparts G and L.  To understand how complicated this procedure is, it is 
necessary to explore it in some detail because, as noted, it too is "strict by 
design." 
According to the provisions of 10 C.F.R. § 2.336(f), the mandatory 
disclosure requirements of § 2.336 are "the sole discovery permitted for 
NRC proceedings [under 10 C.F.R. Part 2] unless there is further provision 
for discovery under the specific subpart under which the hearing will be 
conducted."  NRC Staff and applicants maintain that the choice of hearing 
procedure is solely governed by 10 C.F.R. § 2.310, entitled "Selection of 
hearing procedures."90  The provisions of 10 C.F.R. § 2.310(a) provide that 
 
 88. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations, Changes to the Adjudicatory 
Process 69 Fed. Reg. 2182, 2194 (Jan. 14. 2004). However, unlike the federal rules which, in 
addition to the mandatory disclosures in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1), also allow interrogatories, 
document production requests, depositions, and requests for admissions, NRC essentially 
forecloses any other discovery.  If the federal courts, with their extensive experience, do not 
believe the mandatory disclosures alone are sufficient, it is difficult to see what basis the 
NRC has for its assertion that such disclosures are enough.  NRC offered none when it 
adopted the new rules. 
 89. 10 C.F.R. § 2.336(e) (2008). 
 90. As discussed, infra, there is an alternative interpretation of the regulations in which 
the choice of individual discovery procedures is not governed solely by whether the entire 
proceeding is under Subpart L or Subpart G, but is done on an issue-by-issue basis, as 
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a relicensing proceeding "may be conducted under the procedures of 
subpart L" (emphasis added) but do not mandate such use and in § 2.310(c), 
set forth one way in which a Subpart G proceeding (where provisions 
allowing for the full use of discovery and cross-examination exist) might be 
justified.  Additional discovery and cross examination by the party are 
allowed in Subpart G but prohibited in Subpart L, except cross-examination 
may be available if a special showing is made under Subpart L.91 Thus, the 
choice of the hearing Subpart itself is a significant hurdle that must be 
overcome and the factors that apply to determine which hearing Subpart 
will be used are, at best, confusing.  The most sensible interpretation of 
these confusing regulations, as discussed below, is that any particular 
discovery procedure in Subpart G is available in any case where the use of 
the procedures can be shown to be necessary for "resolution of material 
issues of fact which may be best determined through the use of the 
identified procedures."92 
A determination of whether to use Subpart G or Subpart L is done on a 
contention by contention basis, creating the possibility that in a single 
hearing both Subparts might be applicable.  This could prove confusing if, 
as is often the case, issues with regard to one contention have some bearing 
on a different contention.  Separating the procedures so that they stay within 
the confines of the contention to which they are applicable is the kind of 
line-drawing exercise that invites constant challenges from the party 
opposing the use of the procedure and wastes legal resources squabbling 
over discovery which, in many instances, will be less time-consuming and 
expensive than the actual battle over whether the appropriate procedure is 
being used for the appropriate issue. 
There is a more rational interpretation of the regulations than the one 
advanced by NRC Staff and applicants that is both consistent with the 
regulatory language and more efficient.  Although Subpart G includes a 
number of adjudicatory procedures and allegedly provides the sole basis for 
use of such procedures,93 application of Subpart G discovery procedures to 
 
authorized by 10 C.F.R. §2.309(g) (2008), which is also entitled “Selection of hearing 
procedures”. 
 91. 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.336(f), 2.1204(b)(3) (2008). 
 92. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(g) (2008). 
 93. In its brief to the First Circuit in Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 
391 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2004), the NRC emphasized the availability of subpart G procedures 
as a “sanction” for failure to comply with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.336.  Brief for 
the Federal Respondents at 49; see also 10 C.F.R. § 2.336(e)(1) (2008) (among the sanctions 
available against a party for its “continuing unexcused failure to make the disclosures 
required” is “use of the discovery provisions in subpart G”).  However, there are many 
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a contention may be justified on the basis of the likely need for only one of 
those procedures.  Under § 2.309(g), use of Subpart G is required whenever 
it can be shown that, as to any of the Subpart G procedures, "resolution of 
the contention necessitates resolution of material issues of fact which may 
be best determined through the use of the identified procedures."  That does 
not mean that all Subpart G procedures are available with regard to the 
contention. The regulations provide wide discretion to the ASLB to 
determine whether, and to what extent, a party may use discovery tools 
identified in Subpart G.94 
Thus, arguably, the regulations create a two-step process.  Step one, set 
forth in § 2.309(g), is to demonstrate that it is reasonable to anticipate that 
the use of one or more Subpart G procedures will be required for certain 
contentions.  Once the Board accepts that analysis, it will still be necessary 
for the party seeking to use a particular Subpart G procedure to justify its 
use with regard to a particular contention.  In this way, the Board would 
control the use of each procedure and assure that its use (1) would not 
unduly delay the hearing, (2) would involve the use of a procedure that was 
best to obtain the necessary information, and (3) would serve the goal of 
developing an adequate record.  As discussed, infra, one of the principle 
goals of discovery, if conducted properly, is to reduce hearing time and 
make the entire process more efficient.  Thus, the standard for deciding 
whether any particular Subpart G discovery procedure should be used in a 
particular proceeding is set forth in § 2.309(g) and unequivocally identifies 
a functional test, drawn from the Administrative Procedure Act (see 
discussion infra of 5 U.S.C. § 556).  The touchstone for deciding on the use 
of Subpart G procedures is whether "resolution of the contention 
necessitates resolution of material issues of fact which may be best 
determined through the use of the identified procedures."95  Under § 
2.309(g), a petitioner "must demonstrate by reference to the contention and 
the bases provided and the specific procedures" that this test is met in order 
to proceed under Subpart G. 
 
instances in which full compliance with the requirements of § 2.336 may still leave 
substantial gaps in the available information with regard to material facts needed to develop 
an adequate record or where it will not be possible to demonstrate that the § 2.336 
disclosures are incomplete.  This is the kind of phantom discovery right that pervades the 
NRC regulations but that is almost impossible to exercise in practice.  Either this choice was 
deliberate or the authors of the regulations were unfamiliar with the practicalities of 
litigation. 
 94. See 10 C.F.R, §§ 2.319(f), (g), (k), (q), (r); 2.705(a), (b)(2) (2008). 
 95. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(g) (2008). 
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While this appears to be the most rational interpretation of the NRC 
regulations, NRC Staff and applicants see the matter quite differently.  In 
their view, the choice between Subpart G and Subpart L is an all-or-nothing 
proposition in which intervenors lose the right to any additional discovery 
unless they can demonstrate that they can prove the hearings must be 
conducted under Subpart G.  The test they assert that must be met is set 
forth in 10 C.F.R. § 2.310(d), a test which is totally unrelated to any of the 
discovery procedures and is, at best, a test for determining whether to allow 
a party to conduct cross-examination.96 
There is no doubt that the NRC regulations are confusing because both 
the provisions of 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(g) and 2.310(d) appear to address the 
test for which hearing procedure to use.  The test set forth in § 2.310(d) 
applies a different, and perhaps more lenient, test than § 2.309(g), and 
includes additional alternative tests which are uniquely relevant only to the 
use of cross-examination but of no relevance to whether requests for 
admissions, interrogatories, depositions or document production requests 
should be allowed.  It should be possible to ignore the test in § 2.310(d) 
where a party can meet the test in § 2.309(g).  However, in Entergy Nuclear 
Vermont Yankee LLC. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Station)97 the licensing board ruled, 1) the only test 
for Subpart G use is contained in § 2.310(d) and 2) § 2.310(d) requires a 
showing that the credibility of a witness or the witnesses intent or motive 
must be at issue before any Subpart G procedures are available.98  The 
 
 96. 10 C.F.R. § 2.310(d) (2008): 
In proceedings for the grant, renewal, licensee-initiated amendment, or 
termination of licenses or permits for nuclear power reactors, where the 
presiding officer by order finds that resolution of the contention or contested 
matter necessitates resolution of issues of material fact relating to the 
occurrence of a past activity, where the credibility of an eyewitness may 
reasonably be expected to be at issue, and/or issues of motive or intent of the 
party or eyewitness material to the resolution of the contested matter, the 
hearing for resolution of that contention or contested matter will be conducted 
under subpart G of this part. 
 97. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC. and Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) LBP-04-31, Docket No. 50-271-
OLA, 60 N.R.C. 686, 694-95 (Dec. 16, 2004). 
 98. The Board concluded that § 2.309(g) “simply specifies how to submit a request for a 
particular hearing procedure, but it does not expand or modify the criteria that must be met 
under 10 C.F.R. § 2.310(d).”  Id. at 695 n.7.  With due respect to that Board, no fair reading 
of the language of § 2.309(g) supports the proposition that it is simply a procedural 
regulation describing “how” to submit a request for Subpart G proceedings.  A more logical 
interpretation is that because the focus on much of the controversy about the proposed new 
regulations was on the use of cross-examination, the Commission was focused on cross-
examination when it wrote the test in § 2.310(d) and did not consider the instances in which 
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decision offers no analysis of the bearing those concepts have on the need 
for additional discovery procedures. 
As noted supra, § 2.310(a) does not mandate the use of Subpart L in 
licensing proceedings but merely says that a hearing board may use that 
Subpart unless it finds the standard in § 2.310(d) has been met.  Another 
Vermont Yankee ASLB, addressing the issue of hearing procedure choice 
in a license renewal proceeding, emphasized the discretion afforded the 
hearing board in deciding whether to use the procedures of Subpart L.99 The 
Board found: 
If a specific hearing procedure is not mandated, the plain language 
of 10 C.F.R. § 2.310(a) uses the term 'may' in describing our options 
in selecting the appropriate hearing procedures. The use of the 
permissive 'may' instead of the mandatory 'shall' indicates that even 
if a petitioner fails to demonstrate that Subpart G procedures are 
required, the Board 'may' still find that the use of Subpart G 
procedures is more appropriate than the use of Subpart L procedures 
for a given contention.100 
Thus, if a party meets the provisions of § 2.309(g) for use of Subpart G 
procedures for a contention, then, even if it is a Subpart L proceeding, 
Subpart G procedures should be available.  This is essentially the ruling 
adopted by the ASLB in the Indian Point license renewal proceeding where 
it concluded that it would defer ruling on whether to use Subpart G or 
Subpart L hearing procedures until the case could be made for the need for 
the use of a particular procedure.  Id. Memorandum And Order (Addressing 
Requests that the Proceeding be Conducted Pursuant to Subpart G), 
December 18, 2008 at 13.   
 
other Subpart G procedures might be needed even though the credibility of a witness or the 
intent of a party were not at issue.  See Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations, 
Changes to the Adjudicatory Process 69 Fed. Reg. 2182, 2205, 2222 (Jan. 14. 2004) (where 
the Commission’s discussion of the issue is focused on cross-examination and not discovery 
procedures).  This view is supported by the fact that the Commission does allow cross-
examination in a Subpart L proceeding if a showing can be made that cross-examination is 
“necessary to ensure the development of an adequate record for decision” (10 C.F.R. § 
2.1204(b)(3) (2008)) when the § 2.310(d) test is not met.  10 C.F.R. § 2.309(g) (2008) is the 
counterpart for discovery procedures to be used in a Subpart L proceeding on a contention 
by contention basis when the § 2.310(d) test is not met. 
 99. In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC. and Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Memorandum and Order (Ruling 
on Standing, Contentions, Hearing Procedures, State Statutory Claim, and Contention 
Adoption), LBP-06-20, Docket No. 50-271-LR, at 86 (Sept. 22, 2006). 
 100. Id. 
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But, there is another issue created by insisting that the sole test for 
choosing the Subpart to use is contained in § 2.310(d).  It is arguable that § 
2.310(d), if read "strictly" would allow for an even broader use of Subpart 
G procedures than applying § 2.309(g).  Under § 2.310(d) the test is 
whether the ASLB finds that: 
In proceedings for the grant, renewal, licensee-initiated amendment, 
or termination of licenses or permits for nuclear power reactors, 
where the presiding officer by order finds that [1] resolution of the 
contention or contested matter necessitates resolution of issues of 
material fact relating to the occurrence of a past activity, [2] where 
the credibility of an eyewitness may reasonably be expected to be at 
issue, and/or [3] issues of motive or intent of the party or eyewitness 
material to the resolution of the contested matter, the hearing for 
resolution of that contention or contested matter will be conducted 
under subpart G of this part.101 
The plain reading of this regulation is that Subpart G must be used if any 
one of the three enumerated standards is met. 
As written, by using commas to separate each of the three phrases as 
well as the conjunctive "and/or" phrase between the second and third 
phrase, § 2.310(d) establishes three separate standards that can be read 
either disjunctively or conjunctively.102  As a general rule of statutory 
construction, the use of a conjunctive (such as "or") before the last term in a 
series indicates that each term in the series is intended to be read in the 
disjunctive and given separate meaning.103 In addition, the use of the 
commas, along with the "and / or," signals that each phrase is to be read 
separately.104  Basic grammar principles do not allow for any other reading 
 
 101. 10 C.F.R. § 2.310(d) (2008) (emphasis added) (brackets added). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See United States v. Urban, 140 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir.1998). 
 104. WILLIAM STRUNK JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 2 (3rd ed. 1979) (“In a 
series of three or more terms with a single conjunction, use a comma after each term except 
the last . . . This comma is often referred to as the ‘serial’ comma.”); THE CHICAGO MANUAL 
OF STYLE ONLINE § 6.19 (The Univ. of Chicago ed., 15th ed., 2007), http://www.chicagoman 
ualofstyle.org (“Items in a series are normally separated by commas. . . . When a conjunction 
joins the last two elements in a series, a comma – known as the serial or series comma or the 
Oxford comma – should appear before the conjunction.  Chicago strongly recommends this 
widely practiced usage, blessed by Fowler and other authorities . . . since it prevents 
ambiguity.”); see generally LYNNE TRUSS, EATS, SHOOTS & LEAVES 68-103 (2004). 
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of the text.105  Thus, on its face, the plain meaning of § 2.310(d) establishes 
three separate tests and either all three tests have to be met or any one of 
them can be met.106 
In bypassing the plain text of the regulation, the Vermont Yankee 
Board's September 22, 2006, decision also eschewed a second rule of 
construction: when a statute's language is plain, "the sole function of the 
courts, at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd, is to 
enforce it according to its terms."107 
The Statement of Consideration accompanying the amendments to 
NRC's adjudicatory process in 69 Fed. Reg. 2182 contains statements that 
support the view that § 2.309(g) provides the standard to be used for 
selecting Subpart G procedures and that § 2.310(d) has a more limited role.  
The ASLB panel in Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear 
Generating Station) referred to this regulatory history when it addressed the 
choice of procedures issue.108  In its decision, the ASLB panel recognized 
that the standard set forth in § 2.310(d) was primarily intended by the 
Commission to be tied to a claim for the right to cross-examine.109  The 
ASLB quoted from the Statement of Consideration, where, in adopting the 
current test in § 2.310(d), the Commission offered the following extended 
discussion of its reasoning in adopting the language in that section, showing 
clearly, that it was focused on the portion of Subpart G that relates to cross-
examination when it developed the standards in § 2.310(d), not on 
discovery: 
Rather, the Commission agrees with the thrust of the commenters 
opposing this criterion that, inasmuch as neither the AEA nor the 
 
 105. I am grateful to John Sipos, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney 
General for the State of New York, for the grammatical insights and references related to this 
point. 
 106. As written, § 2.310(d) is not a model of clarity as to the criteria for tests 2 and 3, 
particularly test 3, which appears to have dropped a verb between “eyewitness” and 
“material.”  This merely underscores the conclusion that if the standard for Subpart G 
hearing procedures set forth in § 2.309(g) has been met there should be no reason to enter the 
§ 2.310(d) maze.  Since both sections are titled “Selection of hearing procedures” an 
either/or approach makes the most sense and gives meaning to both provisions. 
 107. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 4 
(2000) (internal citations omitted); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999) 
(“in any case of statutory construction, a court’s analysis begins with the language of the 
statute . . . [a]nd where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well” 
(emphasis added)). 
 108. Memorandum and Order (Denying NIRS’s Motion to Apply Subpart G Procedures), 
RAS 11713, Docket No. 50-0219 LR, at 2-3 (June 5, 2006). 
 109. Id. at 3. 
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APA require the use of the procedures provided in Subpart G, they 
should be utilized only where the application of such procedures are 
necessary to reach a correct, fair and expeditious resolution of such 
matters.  In the Commission's view, the central feature of a Subpart 
G proceeding is an oral hearing where the decisionmaker has an 
opportunity to directly observe the demeanor of witnesses in 
response to appropriate cross-examination which challenges their 
recollection or perception of factual occurrences.  This also appears 
to be the position of several citizen group commenters, judging by 
the reasons given for their opposition to greater use of Subpart L 
procedures.  Hence, the Commission focused on criteria to identify 
those contested matters for which an oral hearing with right of 
cross-examination would appear to be necessary for a fair and 
expeditious resolution of the contested matters.  Common sense, as 
well as case law, lead the Commission to conclude that oral hearings 
with right of cross-examination are best used to resolve issues where 
"motive, intent, or credibility are at issue, or if there is a dispute over 
the occurrence of a past event." 110 
Another reason why the test under § 2.310(d) should not be applied to 
a request for Subpart G discovery procedures is that the test, as interpreted 
by the Vermont Yankee and Oyster Creek ASLBs, is focused on witness 
credibility and intent, thus creating substantial opportunity for delay in the 
proceeding.  For example, at an early stage in the proceeding where the 
provisions of § 2.310(d) are intended to be applied, it is not possible to even 
know the names of the witnesses, much less their proposed testimony.  
Thus, it would be impossible for the Board or the parties to intelligently 
address whether "credibility of an eyewitness may reasonably be expected 
to be at issue, and/or issues of motive or intent of the party or eyewitness 
material to the resolution of the contested matter [are involved]," until after 
the mandatory disclosures required by § 2.336 and the final witness lists 
were submitted.  The ASLB in Vermont Yankee recognized this dilemma 
and chose to postpone a final decision on whether to use the Subpart G 
procedures until after the final witness list was submitted.111 
But there are problems with the Vermont Yankee approach, which was 
necessitated by the ASLB's earlier decision interpreting § 2.310(d) to 
 
 110. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations, Changes to the Adjudicatory Process 
69 Fed. Reg. 2182, 2205  (Jan. 14, 2004) (quoting Union Pac. Fuels v. FERC, 129 F.3d 157, 
164 (DC Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 111. See Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. 
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Initial Scheduling Order, RAS 9241, Docket No. 
50-271 LR, at 3 (Feb. 1, 2005). 
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require a showing on credibility and/or intent as a prerequisite to a Subpart 
G hearing.  First, if the required showing were made at the time of the filing 
of the final witness list, the full panoply of discovery procedures would be 
available for the first time and their use at that time would almost certainly 
cause delay in the hearing procedure, thus defeating the most significant 
justification offered by the Commission for adopting the 2004 rule changes 
as they relate to discovery.112  Second, without the benefit of depositions 
and other discovery procedures it will be extremely difficult to mount a 
challenge to a witness's truthfulness.  Finally, in the unlikely event a case 
can be made that a witness's truthfulness is at issue, there is nothing to 
prevent the party from substituting someone else for the offending witness.  
Once again, the apparent availability of trial type procedures is more 
illusory than real. 
The § 2.310(d) test focuses exclusively on the truthfulness of an 
eyewitness or the intent of that witness.  Neither of those considerations has 
any relevance to whether to allow a deposition, interrogatory, document 
production request or request for admission where the principal goal is to 
"discover" what are the bases for a party's position and/or to eliminate from 
controversy in the hearing issues and facts on which there is no 
disagreement.  It makes no sense to limit access to those important and 
useful discovery tools by tests that have nothing to do with the need for 
their use.  The practical standard set forth in § 2.309(g) ("resolution of the 
contention necessitates resolution of material issues of fact which may be 
best determined through the use of the identified procedures") is easy to 
implement and serves the real goal of the hearing – establish the facts 
relevant to a fully informed decision on the issues in contention. 
Thus, reading the literal language of the relevant regulatory sections 
and applying the policy considerations that underlay the Commission's 
adoption of the 2004 amendments to Part 2, a more rational reading of the 
NRC regulations is that, in a rare case where witness credibility appears to 
be central to the issues and this can be shown at an early date, a party can 
seek to have the entire hearing on that contention conducted under Subpart 
G.  However, in the more normal case, after the mandatory disclosure 
requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.336 are met, a party can seek to use the 
provisions of § 2.309(g) to justify the use of discrete discovery procedures 
 
 112. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations, Changes to the Adjudicatory 
Process 69 Fed. Reg. 2182, 2194 (Jan. 14, 2004) (“The Commission believes that the tiered 
approach to discovery set forth in the proposed rule represents a significant enhancement to 
the Commission's existing adjudicatory procedures, and has the potential to significantly 
reduce the delays and resources expended by all parties in discovery.”). 
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applied to discrete issues to fully develop their case.  To obtain the use of 
any Subpart G procedure, the party seeking its use must demonstrate that 
the particular instance "necessitates resolution of material issues of fact 
which may be best determined through the use of the identified 
procedures."113 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, even if the NRC were to accept 
this common sense interpretation of its regulations, there is a complicated 
series of tests and analyses that must be performed to reach that conclusion.  
That does not encourage efficiency nor meaningful public participation.  In 
addition, by pressing the relevance of § 2.310(d) instead of the more 
common sense approach suggested above, NRC Staff is pushing a test that 
is so narrow it is virtually impossible to meet.  This position by NRC Staff 
supports the earlier conclusion, that NRC Staff and the NRC believe the 
public has nothing useful to contribute to the relevant issues and that all 
hearings are a waste of time and resources that could be better spent by the 
Staff and applicant on other more fruitful endeavors.  It would be refreshing 
if this hidden motivation were openly acknowledged so that there could be 
an open and vigorous debate on the topic.  If the Staff and applicants were 
correct, they could convince Congress to abolish public participation in the 
licensing process, much as advocates like Llewellyn King assert is the case 
for other federal regulatory agencies.  However, if they cannot defend their 
undisclosed premise, which many knowledgeable members of the NRC 
hearing boards and others believe they cannot, then NRC would have to 
abandon this multi-year and multi-pronged effort to cripple public 
participation and could direct its efforts to really making public 
participation more effective and more efficient.  Some modest steps in that 
direction are suggested at the end of this article. 
VII.  SUBPART G: DISCOVERY TOOLS PROMOTE    
JUDICIAL ECONOMY 
Each of the discovery procedures in Subpart G must be justified by the 
party seeking its use and the Board, using its broad discretion, may limit the 
use of a particular discovery tool by, for example, placing a limit on the 
number of interrogatories, requests for admissions, or document production 
requests or by placing time limits on depositions.  This will allow discovery 
to be used as intended in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), 
which is to shorten the hearing by discovering and clarifying facts and 
pinning down the position of parties. 
 
 113. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(g) (2008). 
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When the Commission adopted the 2004 amendments to 10 C.F.R. 
Part 2, it specifically noted that it was drawing upon the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.114 Significantly, when Congress implemented the 1993 
Amendments to the FRCP it did not abolish the right to other discovery 
procedures such as interrogatories, depositions, requests for document 
production, and admissions.  Rather, it strengthened the power of courts to 
control the use of those procedures while continuing other procedures, 
which, when they were adopted, were intended to improve the efficiency of 
the process.  For example: 
Rule 36 [requests for admissions] serves two vital purposes, both of 
which are designed to reduce trial time. Admissions are sought, first 
to facilitate proof with respect to issues that cannot be eliminated 
from the case, and secondly, to narrow the issues by eliminating 
those that can be.115 
Depositions can make the entire process more efficient by assuring 
that persons possessing the knowledge offer the information provided by 
the opposing party rather than persons who the opposing party merely 
wants to have offer the information: 
The testimony of a Rule 30(b)(6) witness is binding on the entity and 
goes beyond the individual's personal knowledge. A corporation has 
an affirmative duty to produce a representative who can answer 
questions that are within the scope of the matters described in the 
notice.  In Bracco Diagnostics Inc. v. Amersham Health Inc., C.A. 
No. 03-6025(SRC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26854, at *3 (D.N.J. 
2005) (citations omitted), the Court succinctly summarized the 
benefits of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition: 
A 30(b)(6) deposition more efficiently produces the most appropriate 
party for questioning, curbs the elusive behavior of corporate agents who, 
one after another, know nothing about facts clearly available within the 
organization and suggest someone else has the requested knowledge, and 
reduces the number of depositions for which an organization's counsel 
must prepare agents and employees.116 
 
 114. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations, Changes to the Adjudicatory 
Process 69 Fed. Reg. 2128, 2194 (Jan. 14, 2004) (“The mandatory disclosure provisions, 
which were generally modeled on Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, have 
been tailored to reflect the nature and requirements of NRC proceedings.”). 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 36, 1970 (Advisory Committee's Note). 
 116. Harris v. New Jersey, No. 03-2002 (RBK), 2007 WL 2416429, at 2* (D.N.J. 2007) 
(footnote omitted). 
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As one district court noted, in chiding the parties for failing to cooperate to 
allow depositions to proceed "any eventual trial of this case will 
undoubtedly be more efficient if the depositions at issue go forward."117 
In addition, courts have recognized that mandatory disclosures, similar 
to those provided under 10 C.F.R. § 2.336, are often insufficient to meet the 
legitimate goals of the opposing parties and that additional discovery will 
be required: 
Plaintiff has requested more specific information in response to the 
request that each person listed in the Supplement to Attachment "A" 
to Defendants' Initial Disclosures (Motion to Compel, Exhibit D) be 
identified and a summary of the discoverable information possessed 
by each provided.  The defendants have provided the identification 
information for the persons listed, but the summary of the 
information possessed by that person is often couched in 
generalizations such as . . . " has information concerning certain 
matters alleged in the pleadings, including Tinley's business 
practices."  The court finds this level of response to be inadequate. 
The plaintiff is entitled to a more complete factual summary of the 
individual's alleged knowledge about the issues relevant to this case 
and the basis for such knowledge.  The plaintiff is entitled to enough 
basic information to allow him to determine, for instance, why the 
individual is placed on the defendants' list of initial disclosure in the 
first instance.  If the defendants more fully describe the information 
possessed by the person listed, the plaintiff can more readily cull his 
list of necessary potential interviews or depositions and therefore 
save time and expense in trial preparation. Given that the defendants 
chose to include the person in their initial disclosures, the defendants 
are already knowledgeable about, at least, the general nature of the 
prospective witness's potential testimonial knowledge.118 
A request for a further specification of information following § 2.336 
disclosures is not clearly contemplated by Subpart L or § 2.336, but it 
would be readily available under Subpart G procedures. 
The judicial recognition of the valuable assistance and improved 
efficiency associated with the proper use of pretrial discovery is also 
endorsed by administrative law judges.  In discussing formal hearings under 
the APA, the Manual for Administrative Law Judges notes that "if [the] 
 
 117. Landeen v. Phonebillit, Inc., No. 1:04-cv-01815-LJM-WTL, 2007 WL 2902212, at 
2* (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
 118. Tinley v. Poly-Triplex Technologies, Inc., No. 07-cv-01136-WYD-KMY, 2008 WL 
732590, at 2* (D.Colo. 2008). 
41
ROISMAN 8/5/2009  12:31 AM 
358 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  26 
exchange of evidence is preceded by an exchange of information, 
subsequent proceedings are easier and the duration of the hearing is 
reduced."119 
Much time is wasted at evidentiary hearings while the Board attempts 
to determine precisely what each witness is claiming, or what commitments 
have been made by the applicant or are being imposed by the Staff.  
Allowing carefully controlled discovery with limits on the time for 
discovery will not only not delay the start of the evidentiary hearing, but 
will undoubtedly allow the hearings to be more focused and proceed more 
efficiently.  
VIII.  NRC REGULATIONS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT 
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC is required to follow the 
mandates of the Administrative Procedure Act.120  The APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
551 (2006), provides the minimum obligations that an agency must meet 
when it provides an opportunity for a hearing, as the NRC does, pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 2239(a).  In Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United 
States,121 the court upheld the NRC procedures for licensing hearings 
insofar as the provisions related to discovery rights and cross-examination. 
The ruling in Citizens Awareness Network regarding the interplay 
between the APA and the AEA, plus the Commission's representation to the 
court about the meaning of its own regulations, provides conclusive support 
for the proposition that the only proper interpretation of the Commission 
regulations is that § 2.309(g) sets an acceptable standard for when Subpart 
G procedures may be used.  Even if § 2.310(d) is an alternative test for 
application of Subpart G rights, Citizens Awareness Network provides 
support for the view that under this regulation, a Subpart G proceeding is 
authorized "where the presiding officer by order finds that resolution of the 
contention or contested matter necessitates resolution of issues of material 
fact relating to the occurrence of a past activity."122  In Citizens Awareness 
Network the Commission argued that its procedure for allowing the use of 
cross-examination was wholly consistent with the mandate of the APA.  It 
 
 119. MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 56 (Morell E. Mullins ed., William H. 
Bowen School of Law 2001) (1993), http://ualr.edu/malj/malj.pdf. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 2231 (2006). 
 121. Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 122. Id. at 345 n.3. 
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referred to the following language in § 2.1204(b)(3) to support that 
proposition: 
The presiding officer shall allow cross-examination by the parties 
only if the presiding officer determines that cross-examination by 
the parties is necessary to ensure the development of an adequate 
record for decision.123 
The Citizens Awareness Network court agreed that the cited language meets 
the APA standard.  In reaching that conclusion the court made the following 
ruling: 
The APA does require that cross-examination be available when 
"required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." If the new 
procedures are to comply in practice with the APA, 
cross-examination must be allowed in appropriate instances. Should 
the agency's administration of the new rules contradict its present 
representations or otherwise flout this principle, nothing in this 
opinion will inoculate the rules against future challenges.124 
Thus, the Citizens Awareness Network decision supports the proposition 
that cross-examination rights, regardless of the Subpart that is being 
applied, "must be allowed in appropriate instances," and those appropriate 
instances are where it is "required for a full and true disclosure of the 
facts."125 
However, if § 2.310(d) is interpreted to require either that "the 
credibility of an eyewitness may reasonably be expected to be at issue" or 
that "issues of motive or intent of the party or eyewitness material to the 
resolution of the contested matter" must also be shown to get a Subpart G 
proceeding, then the barrier to the right of cross-examination under Subpart 
G would be higher than the Citizens Awareness Network decision 
established or than the Commission represented to the court when it 
provided its own interpretation of the regulations. 
In sum, the only reading of 10 C.F.R. Part 2 that is consistent with the 
regulations as written, consistent with the NRC's representations made to 
the First Circuit, and consistent with the ruling in Citizens Awareness 
Network is that a party is entitled to use Subpart G procedures on any 
contention for which it can demonstrate, pursuant to § 2.309(g), that it is 
likely "that resolution of the contention necessitates resolution of material 
 
 123. Id. at 351. 
 124. Id. at 354 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2006)). 
 125. Id. 
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issues of fact which may be best determined through the use of the 
identified procedures."126  This practical test for cross-examination is 
equally applicable to providing parties with the right to seek to use 
discovery procedures whenever they are able to show that such procedures 
are needed to best determine the issue. 
The ability to use discovery procedures in appropriate circumstances is 
also important to enable a party to demonstrate the need for direct cross-
examination by the party.  For example, depositions during which the 
witness must answer questions from the opposing party often disclose 
weaknesses in the witness's testimony that can not be easily explained in a 
written cross-examination plan.  However, the NRC regulations require that 
cross-examination proposals be submitted to the hearing board for its 
consideration and only the board, not any party, decides which questions to 
ask and how to pursue lines of inquiry based on the answers given.  While 
the licensing boards have been diligent in probing witnesses on lines of 
inquiry that they believe are worthy of review, if the board is not convinced 
that the line of inquiry proposed is fruitful or warranted, it does not pursue 
it.  However, it is often the case that the best information concerning why 
an area should be explored comes from the live answers to preliminary 
questions regarding that area, answers which cannot easily be anticipated.  
In addition, the instincts that make a lawyer a good cross-examiner are not 
easily translated into words or disclosed in a cross-examination plan.  
Allowing depositions provides an opportunity to demonstrate the value of 
cross-examination in certain areas using techniques that can either convince 
the Board to allow the party to conduct the cross-examination or to provide 
the Board with evidence of why it should conduct cross-examination on a 
certain topic in a certain way or why no further examination of the witness 
is required. 
The recent movie, Frost/Nixon,127 about the David Frost interview of 
Richard Nixon, focuses on one of those moments in questioning that could 
not have been adequately explained in advance.  Frost pressed Nixon on the 
illegality of the cover up of the Watergate break-in and the President's role 
in that cover-up.  When pressed relentlessly by Frost, Nixon finally 
admitted that his view of the Presidency was that a President can never 
break the law because, by definition, if the President does it, it is legal.  
How could Frost have justified that area of questioning or anticipated where 
his inquiries would lead him in a cross-examination plan? 
 
 126. See generally id. 
 127.  FROST/NIXON (Imagine Entertainment 2008). 
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IX.  FAIR AND EFFICIENT REGULATORY PROPOSALS 
There is no reason why the NRC hearing process cannot be efficient 
and fair.  The problem appears to be that the current regulations were not 
written with any effort to make them fair and the only concept of efficiency 
that was promoted was one that would prevent the public from participating 
in the decision making process or, if it managed to overcome all the 
adversity built into the regulation, to severely restrict the scope of that 
participation. 
There are several steps the NRC can take to make the process more 
efficient and fair: 
1. NRC Staff refuses to accept applications as filed unless they fully meet 
the requirement of being complete in all material respects.  This will not 
prevent post-docketing amendments to applications or prevent the Staff 
from raising questions during the review process, but it will reduce 
those to a reasonable minimum; 
2. Require the applicant to make available, in readily accessible form, 
within ten days of Staff acceptance of the application, all the 
information now required under 10 C.F.R. § 2.336 as to all matters 
contained in the application (i.e. treat the application as though it were a 
complaint filed in a lawsuit and require the applicant to provide access 
to all information in its possession or control that is relevant to the 
allegations contained in the application, much as is now required by 
Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);128 
3. Allow the public at least 120 days from when the applicant makes the 
required disclosures to file contentions and demand a high degree of 
specificity in the contention pleading based on the material in the 
application and the disclosures; 
4. Allow oppositions to the petition to intervene only to reference facts or 
opinions that are included in the original application and the 
disclosures; 
 
128.  A salutary benefit of this procedure would be that applicants would have to develop an 
efficient system for storing information relevant to its application, thus improving its own 
ability to retrieve information for operational and regulatory purposes and making it easier 
for Staff inspectors to locate quickly the information they need to do their work.  Complaints 
from applicants that organizing this material and providing access to will be burdensome is 
either a phony argument or reveals how chaotically applicants maintain their important 
information.   
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5. Require all parties, including Staff and interested states, who are on the 
same side of an issue to file a single pleading within the page limits set 
by the Board for each side of the issue; 
6. If the applicant files a license amendment or a response to an RAI, 
require it to include all the disclosures it would have had to make if the 
material had been filed with the original application; 
7. If any amendment or RAI is substantially based on material that could 
have been included with the original application and its disclosures, 
allow the public and any admitted party 120 days to file any petition to 
intervene based on the new information or any new contention.  
Otherwise, amended contentions must be filed within thirty days and the 
same for new petitions; 
8. Require applicants to file amendments to applications within the same 
time period as any other party is required to file amendments or 
additions to its pleadings and to make the same showing of timeliness as 
to such amendment as any other party must make; 
9. The procedures for hearings will be the full panoply of discovery 
allowed in federal court except, that after the initial disclosures under § 
2.336, any party seeking additional discovery or cross examination 
would have to demonstrate that the discovery or cross examination was 
needed to fully develop the record and that it was the best or most 
efficient way to obtain the information sought; 
10. Technical assistance grants would be available to public parties, other 
than governmental entities, of up to a total of $150,000 for each hearing 
to be used solely to pay for the assistance of experts.  A party would 
announce at the time of filing a petition to intervene its intention to seek 
such assistance and identify the experts it is retaining for which 
reimbursement would be sought.  The determination of entitlement to 
the funds would be made by the licensing board upon application at the 
end of the hearings; no party could file a response to such an application 
unless it could support an allegation that the application was untruthful 
and the Board's decision would be final and not subject to appeal to the 
Commission. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
There is irrefutable evidence of the value of public participation in the 
NRC licensing process.  NRC procedures as now written and implemented 
are antagonistic to such participation.  While no one believes that either the 
NRC or the nuclear industry wants to have unsafe nuclear plants, it is clear 
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that considerations other than safety are dominating many of the decisions 
being made regarding the wisdom of licensing nuclear plants and the 
conditions applicable to such licenses. One party, the public, has 
demonstrated a commitment to safety and a fierce determination to see that 
safety standards are set and implemented.  The nuclear power program in 
the United States cannot tolerate another TMI.  If there is a role for nuclear 
power in the energy future it will only fulfill that role if the public has 
confidence in the safety of the technology.  That confidence is lacking and 
will not be restored until the public is enabled to play a full and meaningful 
role in the licensing process.  It is lapses by NRC Staff and the nuclear 
industry which have created the need to increase public participation and 
add their skeptical analyses to the licensing process.  As Judge Farrar 
stated, the goal of the NRC hearing process should be: (1) to encourage the 
participation of those who are protected by the Atomic Energy Act's grant 
of hearing rights and (2) to provide them the opportunity for a meaningful 
hearing.129  Not until that happens will, or should, nuclear power have an 




 129. In the Matter of Shaw Areva Mox Services (Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), 
LB-08-11, Docket No. 70-3098s-MLA, at 59 (June 27, 2008) (Farrar, J., concurring). 
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